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We combine the newest concepts of non-cooperative coalition theory with a computable 
general equilibrium model close to the seminal RICE-model of Nordhaus and Yang (1996) to 
determine stable coalition structures in a global warming game. We consider three coalition 
games that allow for the formation of multiple coalitions. The coalition games represent 
different designs of climate treaty protocols. Counterintuitively, it turns out that treaties based 
on a unanimous decision rule and exclusive membership lead to superior outcomes than 
treaties with open membership. We also demonstrate that if coalition formation is not 
restricted to a single coalition, as this has been done previously in the literature, coalition 
structures with multiple coalitions will emerge in equilibrium. Most of the regional 
agreements are superior to single agreements. Moreover, our findings confirm those derived 
from simpler theoretical models that a cleverly designed transfer scheme can foster 
cooperation and that from the number of participants the success of a treaty cannot be 
inferred. They also support a conjecture of theory that in the case of greenhouse gases stable 
coalition structures (partial cooperation) can close the gap between the global optimum (full 
cooperation) and the Nash equilibrium (no cooperation) by a substantial amount. 
 
JEL-Classsification: C68, C72, H41, Q25 
Keywords:  design of climate treaty protocol, coalition formation, non-cooperative game 
theory   1
1. Introduction 
In the literature on the economics of global warming two strands of the literature can be 
distinguished. The empirical strand comprises cost-benefit analyses (CBA) and cost-
effectiveness analyses (CEA). Important research topics include methodological and 
conceptual issues on estimating abatement costs (e.g., Weyant  1999 or IPCC  2001) and 
damage costs (e.g., Tol 2002a, b), the determination of optimal global abatement levels and 
efficient allocation of abatement burdens (e.g., d’Arge et al. 1982 and Nordhaus 1991) as well 
as distributional implications of various abatement policies (e.g., Chichilnisky and Heal 1994 
and Eyckmans et al. 1993). In recent years computational general equilibrium models (CGE-
models) have been developed that take many dynamic aspects of climate change as well as the 
relation and feedback between the climate and the economic system into account (see, e.g., 
Nordhaus and Yang 1996 for the seminal RICE model). The importance of this literature lies 
in identifying globally optimal and cost-efficient abatement policies, providing information on 
expected impacts of various climate policies on the economy and the ecological system, as 
well as identifying the gainers and losers in a cooperative "global warming game". However, 
in terms of stability of climate treaties this literature has little to say. Though it is certainly 
true that a necessary condition for a country to accede to a treaty is that it benefits from 
participation, it is by no means a sufficient condition. Even if countries would gain from 
signing a treaty they may nevertheless decide to pursue a non-cooperative policy. Due to the 
public good nature of the global warming problem, free-riding is attractive since the 
abatement contribution of a single country has only a marginal impact on reducing damage 
costs from greenhouse gas concentration but has a substantial impact on its abatement costs. 
In contrast, the theoretical strand of the literature comprises game theoretical analyses on the 
formation and stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs).
1 The importance of 
this literature lies in pointing out the difficulties in designing self-enforcing agreements, 
taking into account that cooperation requires a high amount of consensus because of voluntary 
participation of countries and a successful agreement must neutralize various free-rider 
incentives.  Repeated game models have stressed the importance of credible threats of 
punishment to enforce compliance in IEAs (e.g., Barrett 1994 and 2000, Finus/Rundshagen 
1998, Finus/Tjotta 2002 and Stähler 1996). One main finding is that due to the lack of 
credible punishments compliance can only be ensured for very moderate abatement targets 
and there might be a trade-off between efficiency, effectiveness and stability. A conceptual 
drawback of these models is that the coalition formation process receives little attention and 
                                                 
1   An extensive overview is provided in Finus (2001 and 2003).   2
that stock pollutants cannot be analyzed. In contrast, coalition models analyze participation in 
IEAs applying cooperative and non-cooperative game theoretical stability concepts. 
Cooperative game theory, which is mainly normatively oriented, focused on transfer schemes 
that ensure stability of the (efficient) grand coalition by applying the stability concept of the 
core (e.g., Chander and Tulkens 1995 and 1997 and Germain et al. 2000). A central result is 
that there exists a transfer scheme, which allocates the gains from cooperation in proportion to 
the marginal benefits of reduced environmental damages, ensuring stability of an efficient 
environmental policy (see section 3). A conceptual drawback of the cooperative approach is 
that it only tests stability of the grand coalition, analysis stability in terms of the aggregate 
payoff to coalitions and rests on very strong assumptions about the implicit punishment after 
free-riding of a group of countries. However, the amount of empirical studies is relatively 
large and most rely on a sound empirical module (e.g., Eyckmans and Tulkens 1999, Germain 
et al. 1998 and Kaitala et al. 1995). 
Non-cooperative game theory, which is mainly positively oriented, tried to rationalize the 
problems of forming large and effective coalitions by applying the concept of internal and 
external stability (e.g., Barrett 1994, Carraro/Siniscalco 1993, Hoel 1992 and Hoel/Schneider 
1997). A key result is that whenever cooperation (social optimum) would generate large 
global welfare gains compared to a non-cooperative situation (Nash equilibrium), stable 
coalitions achieve only little and vice versa. Moreover, it is pointed out that from participation 
one cannot conclude success of cooperation: small coalitions may achieve more than large 
coalitions in terms of global welfare and emission reduction. A conceptual drawback of 
internal&external stability is that it exogenously restricts coalition formation to one (non-
trivial) coalition. Moreover, most models rely on very specific assumptions to derive their 
results.
2 Finally, there are only few empirical studies but they compromise on the empirical 
part for tractability (e.g., Botteon/Carraro 1997 and 1998 and Tol 2001). 
Recently, there has been a development of new approaches and concepts in non-cooperative 
game theory that has been termed "new coalition theory" (Finus 2002).
3 Compared to the 
cooperative approach it has two advantages. First, its seems natural to assume that rational 
agents will base their decision of participation in an IEA on individual payoffs and not on the 
                                                 
2   Typical assumptions include for instance a static payoff structure and identical welfare functions 
(symmetric players). An exception is Rubio/Ulph (2001) who consider a dynamic game but 
symmetric players and Barrett (1997) who considers heterogeneous players but uses simulations 
to derive results. 
3   For an excellent overview see Bloch (1997) and Yi (1997).   3
aggregate payoff to their coalition even if in the case of transfers. Second, it explicitly takes 
into account spillovers between coalitions through a valuation function (see section 2). Since 
spillovers are an important source of free-riding, inefficient agreements can be better 
rationalize. Compared to the non-cooperative concept of internal& external stability these 
new developments have the advantage that they do not restrict coalition formation to a single 
non-trivial coalition ex-ante but allow for the co-existence of multiple coalitions. Finally, 
compared to the "classical" cooperative and non-cooperative approaches, new coalition theory 
draws a conceptual line between the rules of coalition formation and stability. Since the rules 
of coalition formation can be interpreted as the institutional setting in which treaty formation 
take place (Carraro/Marchiori/Oreffice 2001 and Ecchia/Mariotti 1998), policy conclusions 
about the optimal design of protocols are possible. Moreover, the reaction of countries after a 
deviation do not follow from ad hoc assumptions but follow from the rules of coalition 
formation and can therefore be related to the rational behavior of agents. 
The philosophy of this paper is to combine a fully fledged empirical model with aspects of 
new coalition theory as this has been done recently by Eyckmans (2001) in order to analyze 
stable climate change coalitions. The purpose is to relate the design of protocols to the success 
coalition formation. We proceed as follows. In section 2 we lay out the game theoretical 
setting and in section 3 we describe the empirical module of our model. Equilibrium coalition 
structures are reported and evaluated in section 4. Section 5 summarizes our main findings 
and concludes with some final remarks. 
2.  The Game Theoretical Model 
2.1 Introduction 
Coalition formation is modeled as a two-stage game. In the first stage players (i.e., countries 
or regions) decide on their membership in a coalition, in the second stage coalition members 
choose their economic strategies. The decision in the first stage depends on the rules of 
coalition formation that follow from the definition of a coalition game. The definition 
comprises three elements: 1) the set of players I={1, ..., N} with a particular player denoted 
by index i or j, 2) the set of coalition (or, alternatively, membership or announcement) 
strategies  12 N Σ=Σ ×Σ × ×Σ …  with a particular strategy of player iI ∈  denoted by  ii σ∈ Σ, 
and 3) a coalition function ψ that maps membership strategies  1N ( ,..., ) σ= σ σ  into coalition 
structures,  :C : ( ) ψ Σ→ σ ψ σ   . A coalition structure 
1M c (c ,...,c ) =  is a partition of players 
where a particular coalition is denoted by 
k c , k {1,..., M) ∈ , 
kl cc ∩= ∅  ∀ k≠l, 
k cI = ∪  and 
cC ∈  where C is the set of all possible coalition structures.    4
The decision in the second stage depends on the rules how players choose their economic 
strategies that follow from the definition of the valuation function. The valuation function 
v(c) maps coalition structures into a vector of individual payoffs (i.e., welfare) via an 
instruction how players choose their economic strategies  ii sS ∈ ,  i1 2N SS SS S ∈= × × × … , for 
a given coalition structure c. Hence, the valuation function is a composition of two functions 
vw =ε    where  : C S:c (c) ε→ ε    is a function mapping coalition structures into economic 
strategies and 
N w:S :s w( s) →   R  is a function mapping economic strategies into welfare 
levels.  
For the first stage we consider three different coalition games, representing three different 
institutional rules how coalitions form. For the second stage we consider only one rule that 
assigns a unique vector of individual payoffs for each possible coalition structure. This 
implies that players choosing a membership strategy in the first stage know for each coalition 
game the implications in the second stage. Hence, games can be solved by backwards 
induction. Consequently, we start in the following by describing first stage 2 and subsequently 
we move on to explain stage 1 of the coalition formation game. 
2.2  Second Stage of the Coalition Formation Game 
Let the welfare function of player i in the global warming game be given by  i w( s ) where s is 
a vector of economic strategies. That is, welfare of player i depends on his own strategy  i s  
and those of other players,  i s− . The exact relationship between economic strategies (e.g. 
emission abatement and captial investment) and welfare as well as the elements in players´ 
welfare function will be outlined in section 3. For the valuation function - mapping coalition 
structures into payoffs - we make the following standard assumptions (Bloch 1997): 
Definition 1: Valuation Function 
Fix a coalition structure  =
1M c (c ,...,c ), let  = v(c ) { i v(c)} i∈I={ i w( (c) ) ε } i∈I ={
∗
i w(s )} i∈I  
and assume for instruction ε  that all players belonging to a coalition 
k c ∈c jointly maximize 
the aggregate payoff to their coalition. Let 
k s  denote the economic strategy vector of 
coalition 
k c  and 
−k s  the economic strategy vector of all other coalitions 
l c ∈c, ≠ lk , and 
assume that equilibrium economic strategy vector  =
* s( c ) ε  for coalition structure c 
satisfies:  
∀ 
k c ∈C, ∀ 
k s ∈















w(s ,s ) where 
* s  is a unique interior equilibrium.  
Definition 1 implies that the valuation of player i,  i v (c), is identified by the entire coalition 
structure c and not only by the coalition to which he belongs. Players behave cooperatively   5
within their coalition but non-cooperatively against players belonging to other coalitions when 
choosing their economic strategies. Put differently, members of a coalition act as one single 
player maximizing the aggregate welfare to their coalition and coalitions play a Nash 
equilibrium strategy in terms of economic strategies. Hence, economic strategies within a 
coalition are efficiently chosen. Consequently, the singleton coalition structure (grand 
coalition) implies an equilibrium economic strategy vector corresponding to the "classical" 
Nash equilibrium (social optimum).
4 Thus, the highest global welfare will be obtained in the 
grand coalition, the lowest in the single coalition structure and any welfare level in between in 
any other coalition structure. For the properties of the welfare function that we define in 
section 3 it turns out that 
* s  is unique and lies well within the boundaries of the economic 
strategy space.  
Definition 1 implicitly assumes no transfers. This is one option that we consider in our 
simulations below, which we call the "no transfer case". Alternatively, we consider a second 
option to which we refer to as the "transfer case". Of course, there are many possibilities how 
the gains of cooperation could be distributed among coalition members as for instance the 
Shapley value (Barrett 1997, Botteon and Carraro 1997) or the Chander/Tulkens´ transfer 
scheme (Chander and Tulkens 1997). We restrict ourselves to a modified version of the last 
transfer scheme of which the details will be laid out in section 3. At this stage it suffices to 
point out that this transfer scheme assumes a particular rule how the surplus from cooperation 
within a coalition is distributed. Hence,  ii i ˆ v( c ) v( c ) t =+  where  i t0 >  implies that a player 
receives a transfer and  i t0 <  that a player pays a transfer.  
2.3  First Stage of the Coalition Formation Games 
In this subsection we define and discuss three coalition games that imply different rules how 
coalitions can form. All games assume that countries simultaneously announce their coalition 
strategy and allow for the co-existence of several coalitions. That is, coalition formation is not 
ex-ante restricted to a single coalition as this is assumed for the concepts of internal&external 
stability and the core that have been widely applied in the literature on IEAs. However, games 
differ in the strategy set and most importantly in the coalition function that maps coalition 
strategies into coalition structures.  
                                                 
4   The grand coalition is that coalition structure where all players are in one coalition and will be 
denoted by c
S. The singleton coalition structure implies that every player forms a (trivial) 
coalition by himself and is denoted by c
N.   6
The first game is called open membership game (OMG) and is due to Yi/Shin (1995). In this 
game players can freely form coalitions as long as no outsider is excluded from joining a 
coalition. Players choose their membership by announcing an address, i.e., a number between 
1 and N. Players that have announced the same address form a coalition. For instance, 
suppose N=6 and  123 1 σ= σ= σ=,  4 2 σ=,  56 3 σ= σ= , then c={{1, 2, 3}, {4}, {5, 6}} 
forms. If player 3 were to announce  3 2 σ=  instead, then 
´ c ={{1, 2}, {3, 4}, {5, 6}} would 
form. More formally, we have:
5 
Definition 2: Open Membership Game (OMG) 
a) The set of coalition strategies of player i∈I is given by  = i {1,...,N } Σ  where a particular 
strategy  i σ  is an announcement of an address. 
b) Coalition function 
OMG ψ  maps strategy vector σ  into coalition structure c as follows: 
i c{ i } =  ∪ {j = ij } σσ . 
Thus in the OMG a player can join any coalition he wants. This strong assumption, however, 
seems not entirely in line with the notion of voluntary participation in all IEAs. For instance, 
the US and developing countries cannot be forced into the Kyoto Protocol. Hence, it seems 
natural to consider an extension of the OMG where players have only unrestricted open 
access to non-trivial coalitions but require the consent of a singleton player if they intend to 
join him. This extension is called a restricted open membership game (ROMG) and has been 
proposed by Bloch (1997) and formalized by Rundshagen (2002). Conceptually, only a slight 
modification of Definition 2 is required, adding to the strategy set an address 0 and specifying 
the coalition function such that players announcing 0 remain singletons. 
Definition 3:  Restricted Open Membership Game (ROMG) 
a) The set of coalition strategies set of player i is given by  i {0,1,...,N } Σ =  where a 
particular strategy  i σ  is an announcement of an address. and  i c  the coalition to which i 
finally belongs, i=1,.., N, then  i c{ i } =  ∪ {j =≠
mm
ij 0} σσ . 
b) Coalition function 
ROMG ψ  maps strategy vector σ  into coalition structure c as follows: 
i c{ i } =  ∪ {j ij 0} σσ =≠. 
For instance, recall our previous example that assumed  123 1 σ= σ= σ=,  4 2 σ=, 
56 3 σ= σ= , so that c={{1, 2, 3}, {4}, {5, 6}} forms and where we argued that if player 3 
                                                 
5    The open membership rule of this game is similar as implied by internal&external stability, 
except that in the OMG multiple coalitions may form. For details see Finus/Rundshagen (2001a).   7
changes his address to  3 2 σ= , then 
´ c ={{1, 2}, {3, 4}, {5, 6}} will come about. In the 
ROMG player 4 can announce  4 0 σ= instead of  4 2 σ= so that no other player can force him 
into a coalition. However, also in the ROMG, any player not in coalition {1, 2, 3} can join 
this coalition and also any player not in coalition {5, 6} can accede to this coalition. This is 
different in the next game.  
In the exclusive membership game (EMG), which is due to Hart/Kurz (1983), players 
announce a list of players with whom they would like to form a coalition.
6 Those players with 
the same list form a coalition. For instance, suppose N=6 and  12 {1, 2, 3} σ= σ= ,  3 {3} σ= , 
4 {4,5, 6} σ=  and  56 {5, 6} σ= σ= , then c {{1, 2},{3},{4}, =  {5, 6}} forms. Players 1 and 2 
have the same list and therefore form a coalition. The same is true for players 5 and 6. Players 
3 and 4 remain singletons. Player 3 is a singleton by its own will and cannot be forced into a 
coalition with players 1 and 2 and player 4 is a singleton against his will since he is not on the 
list of players 5 and 6. In both cases, players are singletons since membership is exclusive. In 
other words, a coalition only forms by unanimous agreement. More formally, we have: 
Definition 4: Exclusive Membership Game (EMG) 
a) The set of coalition strategies of country i∈I is given by  =
i
i {c Σ ⊂ I i∈
i c } where a 
particular strategy  i σ   is a list of countries with which country i would like to form a 
coalition. 
b) Coalition function 
EM G ∆ ψ  maps strategy vector σ  into coalition structure c as follows: 
=
i c{ i }   ∪ {j  = ij } σσ . 
In the same spirit as we defined an equilibrium in economic strategies in the second stage of 
the coalition formation process, it remains to define an equilibrium in coalition strategies in 
the first stage of the game. This task is straightforward since, again, we use the definition of a 
Nash equilibrium but now in the context of coalition strategies. 
Definition 5: Stable Coalition Structures 
Consider a particular coalition function ψ  and valuation function v. Coalition structure c* 
is said to be stable if there exists a coalition strategy 
* σ ∈Σ  generating 
* c  such that ∀ i∈I 
and ∀  i σ∈ i Σ :  − ≥
**
ii i i v( ( ) ) v( ( , ) ) ψσ ψσσ   
Hence, a coalition structure is called stable if it can be supported by an announcement strategy 
vector that constitutes a Nash equilibrium for the first stage of the coalition formation game. 
                                                 
6   Our definition corresponds to what is called ∆-game by Hart/Kurz (1983).   8
Denoting stable coalition structures in the coalition games by 
S C( O M G ) ,  
S C (ROMG) and 
S C( E MG ) ∆ , respectively, then from theory it is known that 
S C( O M G ) ⊂
S C( R O M G )  
⊂
S C (EMG)  holds (Finus and Rundhagen 2003). The intuition of this relation is simple: in all 
games the amount of possible deviations is the same, except that in the ROMG players can 
not join singletons without their consent, which is possible in the OMG. By the same token, in 
the EMG players cannot join a coalition without their consent, which is possible in the 
ROMG (and in the OMG). Thus, if a coalition structure is not stable in the EMG, then it 
cannot be stable in the ROMG and if a coalition structure is not stable in the ROMG, then it 
cannot be stable in the OMG. However, what is not known from theory (except for very 
restrictive assumptions on payoff functions)
7 is whether those coalition structures which are 
stable in the ROMG (EMG) but not in the OMG (ROMG) will be superior in welfare or 
ecological terms. Hence, it will be of particular interest in section 4 to evaluate and compare 
stable coalition structures in the various games from this perspective. Since it will turn out in 
section 4 that in the EMG the set of stable coalitions is relatively large in the "transfer case", 
we introduce an equilibrium refinement. This refinement is simple and requires from a stable 
coalition structure that it is Pareto-undominated by another stable coalition structure.  
Definition 6: Pareto-undominated Stable Coalition Structures 
Let 
S c ∈
S C  be stable coalition structure in some coalition game, then 
S c  is called a Pareto-
undominated stable coalition structure if there is no other coalition structure  ′ S c ∈
S C  where 
at least one player is better off and no player is worse off, i.e., there is no  ′ S c ∈
S C such that ∀ 
i∈I:  ′ ≥
SS
ii v(c ) v(c ) and ∃ j∈I:  ′ >
SS
jj v( c ) v( c ) . 
3.  The Empirical Model 
3.1.  The CLIMNEG World Simulation Model 
The CLIMNEG World Simulation Model (in the sequel referred to as CWSM) is an 
integrated assessment, economy-climate model that resembles closely the seminal RICE 
model by Nordhaus and Yang (1996). The main difference compared to RICE is that utility is 
linear in consumption which is necessary to perform game theoretic analyses in a transferable 
utility (TU) framework. We give here only a short overview of CWSM, a more detailed 
description and motivation can be found in Eyckmans and Tulkens (1999). The key functions 
and parameters are provided in the Appendix. An important feature of integrated assessment 
                                                 
7    See for instance Finus/Rundshagen (2001a). Restrictive assumptions are for instance a static 
payoff structure, identical payoff functions of countries (symmetric players) and orthogonal 
reaction functions that do not hold in our empirical global warming game. See section 3.   9
models is the endogenous feedback of climate change damages on production and 
consumption possibilities. The economic part of CWSM consists of a longterm dynamic, 
perfect foresight Ramsey type of optimal growth model with endogenous investment and 
carbon emission reduction decisions. The carbon cycle and temperature change module are 
the same as in RICE. 
In the CWSM, the World is divided into six regions: USA,  JPN (Japan), EU (European 
Union), CHN (China), FSU (Former Soviet Union) and ROW (Rest of the World). In each of 
these regions and in every time period t the following regional budget equation describes how 
gross production,  i,t Y , can be allocated to consumption,  i,t Z , investment,  i,t I , emission 
abatement costs,  i,t i i,t YC ( ) µ , and climate change damages,  i,t t YD (T ) ∆ : 
  () () i,t i,t i,t i,t i i,t i,t i t YZIY C Y D T =+ + µ + ∆   (1) 
Gross production can be interpreted as “potential GDP”, that is, what could be produced in the 
absence of the climate change problem. Abatement costs are an increasing and convex 
function of emission abatement effort  [ ] i,t 0,1 µ∈ . Abatement effort measures the relative 
emission reduction compared to the Business-as-usual scenario (BAU) without any abatment 
policy. Climate change damages are an increasing and convex function of temperature change 
t T ∆ . Abatement costs,  ii , t C( ) µ , and climate change damages,  ii D( T) ∆ , are treated as 
proportions of “potential production”. Hence, total costs and damages are the product of costs 
and damages with “potential” production  i,t Y , respectively. Rewriting (1) allows interpreting 
the lefthand side of the budget equation as “green GDP”, that is, production net of climate 
change damages and abatement costs: 
  () () i,t i i,t i t i,t i,t Y1 C D T Z I  − µ −∆ =+    (2) 
Every region is characterized by a production function F that maps combinations of capital 
stock  i,t K  and labour input  i,t L  into output. The production technology is assumed to satisfy 
constant returns to scale of the Cobb-Douglas type: 
  () ( ) i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t Ya F K , L F K =≡   (3) 
where  i,t a  is a technology shift parameter that is assumed to increases exogenously over time. 
Labour supply is assumed to be inelastic. Incorporating the technology parameter and labour 
input into the production function, gives a "new" production function i,t i,t F( K) .  
Capital accumulation is described in the standard way: 
  [ ] i,t 1 K i,t i,t K1 K I + =− δ +  (4)   10
where  K δ  denotes the capital depreciation rate. Production gives rise to emissions of 
greenhouse gases. In the CWSM, emissions are propotional to “potential” output: 
  i,t i,t i,t i,t E1 Y   =α −µ     (5) 
where the exogenous parameter  i,t α  denotes the emission-ouput ratio and is assumed to 
decline over time due to exogenous energy efficiency improvements. Emissions accumulate 
in the atmosphere according to a standard linear stock externality accumulation process: 
  [ ] t1 M t i , t
iN
M1 M E +
∈
=− δ + β ∑   (6) 
where M denotes carbon concentration,  M δ  the natural decay rate and β the airborn fraction 
of emissions, that is, the fraction of emissions added to atmospheric concentrations. Carbon 
concentration is translated into temperature change according to an increasing function G: 
  () tt TG M ∆=   (7) 













∑   (8) 
where  i ρ  stands for the discount rate of region i and Ω denotes the time horizon. The strategy 
vector s consists of a time path (35 decades, starting in 1990) for emission abatement and 
investment for all six regions,  i,t i,t i N;t 0, , s{ I, } ∈= Ω = µ … , and hence is of length 2x35x6=420.  
3.2. Computing  Valuations 
Recall from Definition 1 that the valuation function maps coalition structures 
1M c (c ,..., c ) C =∈  into payoffs, 
*
ii i v( c ) w(( c ) ) w( s) =ε= , via an instruction how players 
choose their economic strategies s. For a fixed coalition structure c, Definition 1 assumes that 
coalition members jointly maximize the aggregate welfare to their coalition and that 
equilibrium economic strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium. Thus, coalition 
k c  chooses an 
investment and emission abatement strategy vector  k
k
i,t i,t ic; t0 , , s{ I ,}
∈= Ω =µ
…  in order to 
maximize the aggregate discounted welfare over all periods for given strategies 
k s
−  of other 
countries (that is, given emission paths  i,t E ). Formally:   11
 
{} []









i,t i,t i i,t i t i,t i,t
ic ic
t 1 M t i,t i,t i,t i,t j,t
ic jc





s.t. F K 1 C D G M Z I








   −µ − = +   





  (9) 
This gives rise to two first oder conditions of country i being a member of coalition 
k c i n  






t1 i i,t i, i, i,
M t
t1 ic i,t ii










α +ρ +ρ ∑∑   (10) 
That is, country i at time t chooses its abatement effort such that discounted marginal 
abatement costs equal the sum of all coalition members´ discounted marginal climate change 
damages, taking into account the sensitivity of the climate system and the natural decay of 
atmospheric carbon concentrations. This is a dynamic version of the Samuelson rule for the 
optimal provision of public goods, though here restricted to members of coalition c
k. Coalition 
members internalize only their benefits of emission control but not of outsiders. The second 
first-order condition from which the optimal capital accumulation is derived is given by: 
  () ( ) () ()
[]
ii , t
i i,t i,t i i,t i t i,t K t
i
C
FK 1 C DT 1
1
 ′ µ  ′  ρ =− µ −∆− − µ −δ   +ρ  
  (11) 
This condition is a modification of the standard Ramsey rule for optimal capital accumulation. 
Without climate change problem, condition (11) would simplify to  ii , ti , t K F( K) ′ ρ =− δ . That 
is, capital is allocated over time such that marginal productivity of capital (net of 
depreciation) is equal to the discount rate. In the presence of climate change externalities, this 
rule is modified, implying a downward adjustment of the marginal productivity since the term 
in curly brackets on the right-hand side of (11) is smaller than one. This implies a slower rate 
of capital accumulation, and ceteris paribus of output growth and carbon emissions. 
Given the public “bad” nature of emissions, the economic strategies of countries are 
interdependent. Therefore, we have to solve simultaneously the two first order conditions for 
each country at each time t for every coalition structure c. Since we assume complete 
information, the Nash equilibrium strategy vectors can be interpreted as open loop Nash 
equilibria. In order to calculate numerically Nash equilibria, we use a standard numerical 
algorithm proceeding interatively. The iteration process continues until the Euclidean distance 
between strategy vectors in two consecutive iterations is smaller than a given threshold value.   12
For our data set we never encountered covergence problems and found always a unique 
equilibrium for each of the 203 possible coalition structures.  
Note that our setting implies that if we move from some coalition structure c to any other 
coalition structure c´, this means a change of strategies and affects welfare of countries 
(valuations). Thus if for instance two coalitions in coalition structure c merge, leading to 
coalition structure c´, they usually increase their abatement efforts but this may be matched by 
an expansions of emissions by countries not involved in this merger. The amount of these 
leakage effects depends on the particular coalition structure, on the parameters of the marginal 
damage and cost functions and on the physical parameters of the climate system.  
As pointed out in section  2, we consider a scenario with transfers in which case 
ii i ˆ v( c ) v( c ) t =+ . We adopt the transfer scheme used in Eyckmans and Tulkens (1999) which 
is a modification of the scheme proposed by Chander and Tulkens (1995 and 1997). The 
scheme assumes only transfers within coalitions where the surplus of a coalition 
k c f r o m  
cooperation is allocated according to a proportional sharing rule: 
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  (13) 
The first term in big brackets in (12) sets every country back to its welfare level in the 
singleton coalition structure, the second term allocates the total surplus of coalition 
k c 
compared to the singleton coalition structure in proportion to their marginal damages. Hence, 
the second term in (12) favors countries with relatively high potential production and 
marginal damage estimates and low discount rates since they are entitled to a larger share of 
their coalition´s aggregate payoff. However, the first term ensures that members which would 
loose from cooperation without transfers because they contribute much to joint abatement but 
benefit only little because of low marginal abatement and damage costs break at least even 
(provided there is a surplus from cooperation). Notice that if a coalition´s surplus from joint 
cooperation is positive, then the transfer scheme ensures that every country receives a higher 
payoff than in the singleton coalition structure. Generally, there may be no surplus if leakage 
effects are strong enough, though for our data set it turns out that this is always the case.   13
3.3. Reference  Simulations 
Carbon emissions and atmospheric carbon concentrations 
Figure 1 shows annual world carbon emissions in three scenarios: business-as-usual (BAU), 
implying no emission reduction ( i,t 0i ,t µ =∀∀), Nash equilibrium (NASH), corresponding 
to the singleton coalition structure, and social optimum, SO, correponding to the grand 
coalition.
8 We only consider carbon emissions originating from fossil fuel use where world 
carbon emissions in 1990 amount to approximately 6 gigatons of carbon. It is evident that 
BAU-emissions continuously grow, reach nearly 40 GtC by the year 2100, and more than 
62  GtC in 2200. BAU-emissions continue growing throughout the entire time horizon 
although the pace of growth gradually slows down. NASH-emissions grow at a slightly 
slower rate to reach about 38  GtC by the year 2100 and 59  GtC by 2200. Also NASH-
emissions continue growing though growth decelerates. In contrast, SO-emissions are 
substantially lower: in 2100 they amount to roughly 24 GtC, and only 21 GtC in 2200. This is 
about half of NASH-emissions in 2100 and almost one third of NASH-emissions in 2200. In 
contrast to NASH-emissions, the SO-emission path rises until 2150, levels off at about 
26 GtC and decreases afterwards. 
FIGURE 1 and FIGURE 2 about here 
Figure  2 shows the atmospheric carbon concentration in the three scenarios. In 1990 
atmospheric carbon concentration amounts to approximately 750  GtC. BAU-concentration 
rises steadily and reaches about 1718 GtC in 2100 and 3443 GtC in 2200. Doubling of the 
concentration with respect to 1990 takes place between 2080 and 2090. The NASH-
concentration path follows closely the BAU-path and continues to grow steadily over the 
entire time horizon. In contrast, SO-concentration grows at a much slower rate and reaches 
1368 GtC in 2100 and 2017 GtC in 2200. Doubling of atmospheric carbon concentration is 
postponed until some time between 2110 and 2120. The carbon concentration levels off at 
about 2000 GtC by the year 2200.  
At the level of individual countries there are substantial differences across regions. Taking 
averages of abatement efforts over time, we find in the Nash equilibrium that CHN abates 
about 7.70%, followed by EU with 7.24% and USA with 6.44%. The lowest abatement effort 
is undertaken by ROW with only 1.45%. World average abatement amounts to 3.74%. For 
                                                 
8  All figures report data for a time horizon of 1990 to 2250. However, all calculations were 
conduct for the entire time period of 350 years.   14
ROW low abatement is due to strong free-rider incentives within this heterogeneous region.
9 
For CHN high abatement is due to low marginal abatement costs and for EU this is due to 
their high climate change damage valuation. In the social optimum world average abatement 
is 37.14%. CHN and ROW are required to reduce their emissions substantially more than 
other regions (68.13% and 55.50%, respectively) due to their low marginal abatement costs.  
Macoreconomic Magnitutes 
Figures 3 and 4 show the time profiles of world consumption, Z, investment, I, abatement 
cost, YC, and damage costs, YD, for NASH- and SO-scenario where potential production, Y, 
is the sum of these components (see (1)). It is evident that production and consumption 
profiles are quite similar in both scenarios. The small differences in terms of production and 
consumption stem from the fact that abatement costs and damage costs consitute a small 
portion of total production and consumption. Hence, strong differences in the emission and 
concentration path in both scenarios do not alter much the production and consumption 
patterns and thus also not YC+YD. However, the composition of YC and YD is different in 
the two scenarios. In the Nash equilibrium abatement costs are very small (they do show up in 
Figure 3) but climate change damage are high. In contrast, in the social optimum damage 
costs are relatively small but this gain requires devoting part of the production to emission 
abatement. 
FIGURE 3 and FIGURE 4 about here 
Table  1 displays total discounted consumption  []
t *
ii i , t i t0 v( c ) w( s) Z 1
Ω
= == + ρ ∑  for each 
region in the Nash equilibrium, 
NN
ii vv ( c ) = , and in the social optimum, 
SS
ii vv ( c ) = . The last 
row  World reveals the overall magnitudes at stake. Discounted consumption amounts to 
338,060  million  $ in the Nash equilibrium and 339,831  million  $ in the social optimum. 
Though the gain at the world level from full cooperation is not a small number, in relative 
terms it amounts to only 0.52%. This is due three reasons. First, as pointed out above, 
abatement costs and climate change damages are small compared to production or 
consumption. Second, differences between both scenarios in terms of welfare occure mainly 
in the far future but receive less weight due discounting. Third, abatement costs are relatively 
high compared to the benefits from reduced emissions for greenhouse gases, so that also in 
                                                 
9    As in Nordhaus and Yang (1996) we have revised downward the climate change damage 
parameter of ROW in all partitions in which ROW is a singleton in order to account for the fact 
that this region comprise of many countries.    15
the social optimum only moderate action is required. Nevertheless, as argued above, there are 
large differences between both scenarios in ecological terms. 
Table 1: World Discounted Consumption* 
  N
i v  
S
i v  
SNS
ii i (v v )/v −   i t  
S
i ˆ v  
SNS
ii i ˆˆ (v v )/v −  
USA  78,352 78,989  +0.81  -286  78,703 +0.45 
JPN  42,909   43,224  +0.73  -123  43,101 +0.45 
EU  102,730 103,654  +0.89  -429  103,225 +0.48 
CHN  9,140 8,856  -3.21  +338 9,194 +0.59 
FSU  23,794 24,025  +0.96  -124  23,901 +0.45 
ROW  81,135 81,083  -0.06 +624  81,707  +0.70 
WORLD 338,060 339,831  +0.52  0  339,831  +0.52 
*  Figures are the discounted sum of consumption in million US$1990. All variables as explained in the 
text. 
 
In terms of individual winners and loosers, we find that CHN and, to a lesser extent, ROW 
would lose from full cooperation without transfers.
10 With transfer individual rationality holds 
for all countries in the social optimum and as mentioned above for any other coalition 
structure different from the grand coalitions for our data set as well. Hence, without transfers 
the grand coalition cannot be an equilibrium in any of the coalition formation games defined 
in section 2. However, individual rationality is only a necessary condition for stability and as 
we will see from section 4 by no means sufficient to guarantee stability. 
4. Stability  Analysis 
In this section we report on results of our stability analysis in the three coalition formation 
games. In subsection 4.1 we explain the information contained in Table 2 and 3, summarizing 
our results. In subsection 4.2 we provide some rationale that helps to explain membership in 
stable coalitions and in subsection 4.3 we evaluate and compare stable coalition structures in 
the three coalition formation games. 
4.1  Information in Table 2 and 3 
Table 2 and 3 list stable coalition structures in the no transfer and transfer case, respectively. 
The first column lists the number of a particular coalition structure where to each coalition 
structure a number between 1 and 203 is attached. Coalition structure 1 represents the 
singleton coalition structure, corresponding to the "conventional" Nash equilibrium, whereas 
coalition structure 203 is the grand coalition, corresponding to the "conventional" social 
                                                 
10   A more detailed analysis of the incentive to cooperate is provided in subsection 4.2.   16
optimum. Apart from stable coalition structures, these coalition structures are listed because 
they represent benchmarks. Column 2 lists coalition structures in partition form where non-
trivial coalitions are indicated bold. Column 3, 4 and 5 contain information whether a 
coalition is stable in a coalition game (n=not stable, y=stable). We list only those coalition 
structures that are stable and Pareto-undominated by any other stable coalition structure in at 
least one game. For instance, in the transfer case (Table 3), there are 34 stable coalition 
structures in the exclusive membership game (EMG) of which 19 are Pareto-dominated by 
other stable coalition structures and none of them is stable in the open membership games 
(OMG and ROMG). Hence, only 15 coalition structures are listed in Table 3. Since some of 
these coalition structures are Pareto-dominated in the EMG but not in the ROMG, Pareto-
domination is indicated by a gray cell. 
TABLE 2 and 3 about here 
Column 6 gives total discounted welfare over all regions and the entire time period (1990-
2330). We take this feature to sort coalition structures in descending order. Column 9 gives 
concentration at the end of the time period and column 12 indicates total emissions over all 
regions and the entire time period. In order to evaluate coalition structures, we compute two 
indices. The first index is called the "degree of externality index" (DEX). This index measures 
the relative differences between the outcome in a coalition structure (superscript C) and the 
























































where all variables are those of section 3. By definition, in the social optimum the degree of 
externality is 0. The second index is called the "closing the gap index" (CGX). This index 
measures the difference between the outcome in a coalition structure and the social optimum 
in relation to the difference between the Nash equilibrium and the social optimum. It is 
defined as 
CN 100 (1 DEX /DEX ) ⋅−  where the superscript N stand for Nash equilibrium. 
Thus, by definition, this index is 100 in the social optimum and 0 in the Nash equilibrium. All 
numbers have been rounded to "sensible" digits for interpretation.   17
4.2  Rationalizing Membership in Stable Coalition Structures 
From a first glance at the tables one is let to conjecture that intuition is not confirmed by the 
results: many coalitions of stable coalition structures comprise countries of which one would 
expect that they should show little interest in forming a coalition and/or not with those 
countries listed in Table 2 and 3. For instance, it may be suspected that "rest of the world" 
(ROW) should show little interest in participating in an agreement and that USA and ROW 
will hardly be in one coalition because of different interests. However, a closer look at the 
underlying fundamentals resolves this puzzle though it is difficult to trace all effects in a 
general equilibrium model. First, climate change damage parameters in our model are 
modified estimates of RICE that may not be in line with the presumed perception of damages 
in a country. For instance, it has been argued that developing countries will pay little attention 
to environmental damages due to strong preferences for economic growth. This would suggest 
for instance that the damage costs of ROW should be very low, though in our model they are 
relatively high, despite we assume higher discount rates for ROW and CHN than for the rest 
of the countries (see Appendix). Second, the conjecture that countries forming a coalition with 
other countries are the "good guys" and countries remaining singletons are the "bad guys" is 
premature. This conjecture presumes that coalition members will substantially reduce their 
emissions compared to the non-cooperative benchmark and compared to outsiders. However, 
this is not always the case for at least two reasons. One reason is that if for instance two 
countries form a coalition where both countries face high marginal abatement costs and low 
marginal damages costs, then joint welfare maximization implies only a marginal reduction 
compared to the non-cooperative benchmark. In contrast, a singleton with low marginal 
abatement costs and high marginal damage costs may reduce emissions substantially by itself. 
A second reason is that due to non-cooperative behavior and externalities across coalitions, 
leakage effects may lead to downgraded abatement efforts in equilibrium (as derived from the 
valuation function). Taken together, there may well be stable "coalitions of the lazy guys". 
Third, the incentive to form a stable coalition follows from a subtle incentive structure. In 
order to shed some light on the fundamentals, we construct two indices that are based on two 
values. The first value aims at measuring the interest of a country in climate change policy in 
terms of benefits. For this we compute discounted marginal damages in the Nash equilibrium 
for each country and evaluate those numbers in relative terms (ROW=100%). From Table 4 it 
is evident that - neglecting abatement costs - EU and ROW have the highest and CHN the 
lowest interest in reducing greenhouse gases. The second value aims at measuring the interest 
of a country in cooperation in terms of abatement contributions. As follows from the first 
order condition in (10), countries with low marginal abatement cost will have to contribute   18
more to joint abatement than those with high marginal abatement costs. Since it turns out for 
our data set that marginal abatement cost curves never intersect, we can compute emission 
reductions for an arbitrary fixed tax rate. We choose a uniform tax rate of 20 US$ per ton of 
carbon in each period. Again, we evaluate emission reductions in relative terms and compute 
average relative contributions for the entire time period (CHN=100%). From Table 4 it is 
evident that CHN and ROW have to make the highest contributions due to their low marginal 
abatement costs. In order to depict the entire incentive structure, we compute a free-rider 
index 1 in row 3 that is defined as abatement contribution (row 2) divided by marginal 
damages (row 1), evaluated in relative terms (CHN=100%). Free-rider index 2 (row 4) ranks 
these numbers that makes subsequent interpretation easier. From Table 4 it is evident that 
CHN has by far the highest free-rider incentive. That is, CHN has to contribute very much to 
a joint abatement policy but benefits only little from reduced damage costs. The opposite 
incentive structure is that of the EU: she contributes less on average to cooperation but 
benefits more than proportionally from reduced damages. 
Table 4: Incentive Index of Coalition Formation 
    USA  JPN  EU  CHN  FSU  ROW 
1  marginal  damages  64 35 91 10 21  100 
2  abatement  contribution  25 21 23  100  29 79 
3  free-rider  index  1  3.9 6.0 2.5  100.0  10.4  7.9 
4  free-rider  index  2  2 3 1 6 5 4 
 
For the interpretation of the free-rider indices three remarks are in order. 1) The indices can 
only be a crude measure since it represents only an "average incentive structure" that 
generally differs from those in particular coalition structures. 2) Though it is certainly true 
that a high free-rider index indicates that a country has no interest in forming a coalition, not 
only the absolute value is important but the relative distance between those values. That is, 
countries with a high but similar index may well form a coalition because of similar interests 
as this is the case for instance for FSU and ROW in coalition structure 153 in Table 2. 3) The 
indices can only be used in the case of no transfers since transfers may imply a substantial 
redistribution of welfare so that also high free-rider index countries can have an incentive to 
form a coalition. 
Keeping these caveats in mind, we can now try to rationalize membership of some stable 
coalition structures listed in Table 2 and 3. Without transfers (Table 2) it is evident that CHN   19
is never a member of a stable coalition because of its strong free-rider incentive. Also EU is 
only a coalition member in one stable coalition structure (No. 155) since countries have 
usually no interest forming a coalition with EU because of her high marginal damages. This 
would require substantial emissions reductions by coalition partners combined with little 
contribution of EU to joint efforts. The only exception is a coalition with ROW in coalition 
structure No. 155 since ROW faces even higher marginal damages than the EU. Coalition 
structures which demonstrate that countries with similar interests form a coalition are for 
instance No. 26, 156, 20, 6, 153 and 5.
11  
In the case of transfers the picture is different. Now, CHN is a frequent member in coalitions 
within stable coalition structures; in particular in coalitions with the USA, EU and ROW. 
Those countries have marginal damages above average and therefore have an interest in 
ambitious emission reductions. Due to high marginal abatement costs, they benefit from 
cheap emission reduction of CHN. CHN´s interest in participation stems from the fact that it it 
is compensated for its high contribution and receives a fair amount of the suplus from 
cooperation. Taken together, transfers balance different interests and thus allow to reap 
efficiency gains from cooperation between unequal partners. 
4.3  Evaluating and Comparing Stable Coalition Structures 
General comments 
The grand coalition is not stable in the sense of definition 5. In the no transfer case this 
follows immediately from the fact that CHN and ROW are worse off than in the singleton 
coalition structure (see Table 1). However, individual rationality is only a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for stability. Hence, also in the case of transfers, the grand coalition is not 
stable. In fact, only coalition structures comprising small coalitions with no more than three 
members are stable. The reason is that the incentive to leave a coalition increases with the 
number of coalition members. Nevertheless, also agreements with only few countries can 
close the gap between first best and no cooperation by a substantial amount. For instance, in 
the EMG the stable coalition structure associate with the highest global welfare closes the gap 
between Nash equilibrium and social optimum by 60.7 and 74.5 percent in the case of no 
transfers and transfers, respectively, though this percentages are lower for concentration and 
emissions. However, also the degrees of externality for concentration (138 %) and emissions 
                                                 
11   Using free-rider incentive index 2 we find: 26: {2, 5, 4}, 156:{2, 3, 4}, 20: {3, 5, 4}, 6: {2, 4}, 
153: {2, 3}, {5, 4} and 5: {3, 4} where the values are index numbers of coalition members in 
these coalition structures.   20
(106 %) are substantially higher than for welfare in the Nash equilibrium so that a 50 
percentage reduction of externalities in a stable coalition structure may be judged as a success. 
Interestingly, the "degree of cooperation" is not necessarily an indicator for success as is 
evident from comparing coalition structure No. 133 (three coalitions of two countries) and 
coalition structures No. 63 to 64 (only two coalitions of two countries) in the case of transfers.  
The empirical findings are perfectly in line with the theoretical findings of non-cooperative 
coalition theory, applying the concept of internal&external stability (see Introduction and 
Finus 2003). First, the number of participants or the degree of cooperation is not an indication 
of the success of coalition formation. Second, whenever the degree of externality is low, only 
small coalitions are stable but they achieve much and if the degree is high the opposite holds. 
In our context this degree is small in welfare terms (though admittedly it is larger in 
ecological variables) since abatement costs are relatively high compared to the benefits from 
reduced damages. As Barrett (1994) pointed out, this relation may be reversed for CFCs, 
predicting large coalitions but less success for solving the problem of the depletion of the 
ozone layer effectively. In this light, the current Kyoto Protocol may be seen less pessimistic 
despite its rather low participation. 
Open versus exclusive membership 
In the OMG no coalition structure is stable. The assumption of unrestricted accession to any 
coalition causes great instability. This is similar in the ROMG, though singletons cannot be 
joined without their consent. Hence, the problem of instability is mitigated to some extent and 
hence five coalition structures are stable in the case of transfers. The fact that the singleton 
coalition structure is stable in the ROMG follows from the definition of this game. If each 
country announces address 0, then a single deviation cannot lead to a different coalition 
structure and hence a simultaneous announcement of strategy  i 0 σ=  by all countries is 
trivially a Nash equilibrium coalition structure.
12 From an theoretical point of view this may 
be regarded as an advantage since it guarantees existence of an equilibrium. From an applied 
point of view this may be perceived as disturbing. Why should the singleton coalition 
structure be considered as stable if two or more countries have an incentive to form a 
coalition? However, this apparent shortcoming is removed by our stronger definition of 
Pareto-undominated stability. In this sense, the singleton coalition structure is not stable in the 
transfer case but is stable in the no transfer case because no other stable coalition structure 
                                                 
12   A similar argument establishes that the singleton coalition structure is always a Nash equilibrium 
coalition structure in the EMG.   21
exists. Thus, not only our argument developed in section 2 that ROMG better captures 
features of actual international environmental treaty formation supports the superiority of the 
ROMG over the OMG but also our empirical applications.  
A comparison between stable coalition structures in the ROMG and the EMG reveals three 
features. First, trivially, the theoretical prediction that any coalition structure that is stable in 
the ROMG is also stable in the EMG but not vice versa is confirmed. Second, more 
interesting, there are far more stable coalition structures in the EMG than in the ROMG. For 
instance, in the no transfer case no non-trivial stable coalition structure exists in the ROMG 
whereas in the EMG there are seven Pareto-undominated stable coalition structures. Third, 
some of the additional stable coalition structures in the EMG compared to the ROMG are 
superior in terms of welfare, concentration and emissions. For instance, in the case of 
transfers there are two stable coalition structures in the EMG (No. 63 and 31) that are superior 
to that stable coalition structure, which produces the highest global welfare as well as the 
lowest concentration and emissions in the ROMG (No. 46). Thus, we can conclude that 
exclusive membership is conducive to stability and efficient cooperation. 
From a theoretical point of view the results are interesting since internal & external stability 
as applied in previous work in non-cooperative coalition theory de facto implies open 
membership. From an applied point of view, the results are interesting in two respects. First, 
almost all past IEAs have no provision to restrict membership. Hence, it may be worthwhile 
to think whether to adopt an exclusive membership rule, which is typical for club good 
agreements as for instance NATO and European Union, also for public good agreements like 
those on climate change in the future. Second, exclusive membership also requires some 
degree of unanimity between coalition partners to form a coalition. Thus, though it is usually 
argued that the need for consensus within international organization and governments implies 
that only less ambitious policies (of the least common denominator type) can be implemented, 
in the present context consensus is conducive to cooperation.  
No transfers versus transfers  
Tables 2 and 3 reveal that the first nine stable coalition structures in the EMG in the case of 
transfers (No. 63 to 133) are superior to the coalition structure with the highest welfare in the 
case of no transfers (No. 26). Thus, the conjecture is confirmed that transfers are an important 
tool to increase participation and the success of stable agreements. Nevertheless, also transfers 
cannot totally overcome free-rider incentives and hence stable coalition structures comprise   22
only small coalitions and welfare is below, and concentration and emissions above globally 
optimal levels.  
The results are line with almost all theoretical and empirical findings of coalition models that 
show that transfers lead to superior outcomes (see the literature discussed and cited in Finus 
2003). The results also support efforts within recent IEAs, like the Montreal and Kyoto 
Protocol, to establish multilateral funds that compensate developing countries for cooperation.  
Multiple versus single coalitions 
In the transfer case all coalition structures of higher ranks in terms of global welfare that are 
stable in the EMG comprise of multiple coalitions. In the case of no transfers there are also 
two stable coalition structures with multiple coalitions. This suggests that not only will 
countries form multiple agreements if coalition formation is not restricted to a single coalition 
but also that multiple may be superior to single agreements from a global point of view. Due 
to strong incentives to leave a coalition (or to remain a singleton) those multiple coalitions are 
not necessarily large than single coalitions (and in fact they are not), but some countries 
decide to form their own agreement instead of remaining without any partner. The intuition is 
that it is easier to guarantee stability in small coalitions with members of similar interests than 
in large coalitions that automatically imply a larger degree of heterogeneity.  
From a theoretical point of view, the results suggest that restricting coalition formation 
exogenously to a single coalition as implied by internal & external stability may lead to wrong 
conclusions. From an applied point of view, results are somehow puzzling since the record of 
past IEAs suggests that countries form only single agreements. This leads us to two 
controversial conjectures. First, if existing IEAs are the result of an unrestricted coalition 
formation process, then our predictions would be wrong. One reason may be that our results 
are derived from a stylized model of coalition formation and that parameter assumptions do 
not reflect the "true" incentive structure. However, it has to be pointed out that our main 
conclusion from above is very robust to different specifications of parameter values and has 
also be tested for other coalition games.
13 Second, if coalition formation has been restricted 
for institutional and/or political reasons in the past, this suggests altering the rules in the 
future. For instance, under the Kyoto Protocol the USA insisted for a long time before it 
dropped out that they would only ratify the treaty if also developing countries would accede to 
this agreement. Thus, it may be the case that more could have been achieved if separate agree-
ments were designed for industrialized countries, developing countries and countries in 
                                                 
13   Results of sensitivity analyses are available upon request from the authors.   23
transition. This last remark points at the possibility to reconcile both conjectures. Taking a 
broader perspective, some modern IEAs, as for instance the Kyoto and Montreal Protocol, 
may be interpreted as separate agreements under the umbrella of one treaty since they impose 
differentiated abatement obligations on participants. In any case, our results support the 
philosophy of different responsibilities of "modern" IEAs that contrast with "old" IEAs, 
frequently specifying abatement obligations in terms of uniform emissions reductions (see 
Finus 2003 on empirical evidence). 
5.  Summary and Final Remarks 
We modeled coalition formation in international climate change control as a two stage game: 
countries decide in the first stage on their membership in a coalition and in the second stage 
coalition members choose their economic strategies. For the first stage we considered three 
coalition games that represent three different rules how coalition form: open membership, 
restricted open membership and exclusive membership. In the second stage we assumed that 
coalition members jointly chose abatement and capital investment strategies as to maximize 
the aggregate welfare to their coalition. Based on an empirical computable general 
equilibrium model that captures a time horizon of 350 years we computed payoff vectors 
(valuations) for six world regions and for each possible coalition structure. For each coalition 
game we computed stable (equilibrium) coalition structures and evaluated them in terms of 
global welfare, concentration and total emissions. From the many results we would like to 
mention four. 1) Stable coalition structures comprise of coalitions with only a few members. 
Nevertheless, in the context of climate change those stable coalition structures can close the 
gap between no cooperation and full cooperation to a large extent. Thus, "small may be 
beautiful (or least not that ugly)"! 2) Under exclusive membership more coalition structures 
are stable than under open and restricted open membership that are also superior in welfare 
and ecological terms. We suggested to consider changing the open access rule of most IEAs 
to restricted access in future IEAs as implied by most club good agreements. Moreover, the 
results indicate that the need for consensus in international politics may not always hamper, 
but, in fact, may be conducive for the implementation of ambitious abatement policies. 
3)  Without transfers countries with a similar incentive structure in terms of marginal 
abatement and damage costs form coalitions. Countries with either low or high marginal 
abatement and damage costs will usually not participate in cooperation since they do not find 
"equally-minded" partners. With transfer contrasting interests can be balanced that allows to 
reap efficiency gains from cooperation. The result support the efforts in recent IEAs like the 
Kyoto and Montreal Protocol to raise participation of developing countries with low marginal   24
abatement costs via compensation payments. 4) Many stable coalition structures comprise of 
multiple coalitions that are superior to single coalitions in welfare and ecological terms. The 
reason is that it is difficult to form one large coalition because of strong free-rider incentives 
but it is easier to form several small coalitions because interests within a coalition are more 
homogeneous. This suggests not to pursue a strategy to get as many countries into "one 
climate boat" in future treaties but to allow for differentiation of abatement targets and/or 
regional agreements. 
For future research we would like to mention three (of certainly many possible) extensions. 
First, other transfer schemes than the Chander/Tulkens´ transfer rule that we considered could 
be analyzed. The purpose of this exercise would be to find an "optimal transfer scheme" that 
allows - in the face of heterogeneous interests - for stable coalition structures generating high 
global welfare. Second, and closely related to the first point, the effect of different permit 
trading schemes on coalition formation could be analyzed. Third, stable coalition structures 
could be determined for other coalition formation games. These coalition games could be 
different in terms of the design of protocols (e.g., Carraro, Marchiori and Oreffice 2001 and 
Finus and Rundshagen 2003), could capture the feature of a minimum participation that is a 
typical requirement in many IEAs before a treaty becomes binding for all participants (Black, 
Levi and de Meza 1992), and could model coalition formation as a sequential process with 
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List of Variables 
 
i,t Y   production (billion 1990 US$) 
i,t Z   consumption (billion 1990 US$) 
i,t I   investment (billion 1990 US$) 
i,t K   capital stock (billion 1990 US$) 
i,t C   cost of abatement (billion 1990 US$) 
i,t D   damage from climate change (billion 1990 US$) 
i,t E   carbon emissions (billion tons of C) 
i,t µ  emission  abatement 
t M   atmospheric carbon concentration (billion tons of C) 
t F   radiative forcing (Watt per m²) 
x
t F   exogenous radiative forcing (Watt per m²) 
a
t T   temperature increase in the atmosphere (°C) 
0
t T   temperature increase in the deep ocean (°C) 
t T ∆   change of temperature increase in the atmosphere (°C) 










































i Y  (%)  0
i K  (%)  0
i L  (%)  0
i E  (%) 
USA 5,464.796 25.9  14,262.510 26.3 250.372 4.8  1.360 20.5
JPN 2,932.055 13.9  8,442.250 15.6 123.537 2.4  0.292  10.9
EU 6,828.042 32.4  18,435.710 34.0 366.497 7.0  0.872  28.9
CHN 370.024 1.8  1,025.790 1.9 1,133.683 21.5  0.669  3.0
FSU 855.207 4.1  2,281.900 4.2 289.324 5.5  1.066  6.8
ROW 4,628.621 22.0  9,842.220 18.1 3,102.689 58.9  1.700  29.9
World 21,078.750 100.0 54,290.380 100.0 5,266.100 100.0  5.959  100.0
* 
0
i Y  and 
0
i K  million US$, 
0
i L  million people and 
0
i E  giga tons. 
  i,1 θ   i,2 θ   i,1 b   i,2 b   i ρ  
USA 0.01102  2.0 0.07  2.887 0.015
JPN 0.01174 2.0 0.05 2.887 0.015
EU 0.01174  2.0  0.05  2.887 0.015
CHN 0.01523  2.0  0.15  2.887 0.030
FSU 0.00857 2.0 0.15 2.887 0.015
ROW 0.02093  2.0  0.10  2.887 0.030
Global Parameter Values 
i,t a 
i,t L 
i,t α  
K δ      
γ       
β      
M δ     
1 τ       
2 τ       
3 τ       
λ 
0 M      
a
0 T      
0




capital depreciation rate 
capital productivity parameter 
airborne fraction of carbon emissions 
atmospheric carbon removal rate 
parameter temperature relationship 
parameter temperature relationship 
parameter temperature relationship 
parameter temperature relationship 
initial carbon concentration 
initial temperature atmosphere 















Regional Parameter Values 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































*  Y=Z+I+YC+YD as in equation (1). World production in 1990 is nomalized to 100. 
 
    





The Center for Economic Studies (CES) is the research division of 
the Department of Economics of the Katholieke Universiteit 
Leuven. The CES research department employs some 100 people. 
The division Energy, Transport & Environment (ETE) currently 
consists of about 15 full time researchers. The general aim of ETE 
is to apply state of the art economic theory to current policy 
issues at the Flemish, Belgian and European level. An important 
asset of ETE is its extensive portfolio of numerical partial and 
general equilibrium models for the assessment of transport, 
energy and environmental policies. 
ETE WORKING PAPER SERIES 
2003 
n°2003-17  Eyckmans J., Finus M. (2003), Coalition Formation in a Global Warming 
Game: How the Design of Protocols Affects the Success of 
Environmental Treaty-Making 
n°2003-16  Eyckmans J., Schokkaert E. (2003), An “Ideal” Normative Theory for 
Greenhouse Negociations 
n°2003-15  Bigano A., Proost S. (2003), The opening of the European electricity 
market and environmental policy: does the degree of 
competition matter? 
n°2003-14  Pepermans G., Willems B. (2003), Regulating transmission in a spatial 
oligopoly: a numerical illustration for Belgium 
n°2003-13  Eyckmans J., Pepermans G. (2003), Is er toekomst voor kernenergie in 
België? 
n°2003-12  Franckx L. and D’Amato A. (2003), Environmental policy as a multi-task 
principal-agent problem 
n° 2003-11  Proost S. And  Van Dender K. (2003), Marginal Social Cost Pricing For All 
Transport Modes And The Effects Of Modal Budget Constraints  
n° 2003-10  Mayeres I., Van Regemorter D. (2003), Modelling the health related 
benefits of environmental policies - a CGE ANALYSIS for the EU 
countries with GEM-E3 
n° 2003-09  De Borger B., Proost S., Van Dender K. (2003), Congestion And Tax 
Competition In A Parallel Network 
n° 2003-08  Pepermans G., Driesen J., Haeseldonckx D.,  D’haeseleer W. and 
Belmans R. (2003), Distributed generation: definition, benefits 
and issues 
n°  2003-07  Moons E., The development and application of economic valuation 
techniques and their use in environmental policy – A survey 
n° 2003-06  Muys B., Deckmyn G., Moons E., Quijano J.G., Proost S. and Ceulemans 
R. (2003), An integrated decision support tool for the prediction 
and evaluation of efficiency, environmental impact and total 
social cost of forestry projects in the framework of the Kyoto 
protocol 
n°  2003-05  Proost, S. and Van Regemorter, D. (2003), Climate change policy in 
European countries and its effects on industry 